CONOMIC fon'en:asts 1w govcn-nn'ncnuf agcmuuies often am-c tainted by ahlegafions of pnihitimal partisanuship. h"orerasts by flue Counn:mh nuf Econonuuic Advisers ICEAI fom' examnupbe, which m-epm-esenut the expected inuuparts of the Presidenut's emononunir policies, have Iieeru mhuaractemmzed as "mosy sm:emuan-ios," tluat an'c too optimistic about thue fumespects fmim-stronug n-cal gn-owthu amud hower unuerunphovnucnt, lnu nerenf year's, even White House inusiden's have alleged that the CE,Vs numuuliers wen'e ''cooked'' fri prim-tray favorable econuonnic outn:onnes,' Conugn'css bias its owmu cronuonnuir agenry, the Conngressional Budget Office ICBOI, that aismi pmoduces fdimerasts for-m'cal gn-on'ttu, m.mnenuplovmuuerut anti imiflatiomu omu a fimetafnte sinuuihan-to fhiat of flue CEA, Inn rontn-ast to thue (lEA, tine CBO fom'erasts buave biccru widely m'egamded as hieing accurate anud objective. Stilt, tluev too luau'e been cn-iticized as biased nir-inuaccimn-ate, especialhy when tiue CEA anud CBO outlooks have differ-ed substantiatE',"
Chart 1 CEA and CBO Real GNP Forecasts vs Actual GNP Growth
nomic Report of tlue President, whuirhu tlue CE~p utihistues amunuahlv, imuctudcs a stuort essay liv the Presiderut anud a nunurhu longer report liv fine CE±s taff; tvpicallv~it also includes anu ecoruomnuir fnin-en:asf for tine year-ahead, Tine forecasts mu fine Report n:an be ncgam-deni as fr-ue e,v ante pn-edimtiomus liecause tticv anc neleased mu late ,Januan'y nir Feliruan', welt hiefor-e amuv nifhicial eroruomuuim data fnim flue calemudam'~'eam-am-c reported.
'l'lue Comugressininual Budget Offire was esfabhishued lii 1974 as pant of flue mueuv budget process cm-eated liv the Cor'ngm-essiomuat Budget arid Imnupo unuclmnnemnf Comutroh Art, 'blue Chic) was est alitislued tni provide C'.onngr'ess ''with detailed lirndgct itul'or'-mn'raf ion anid studies of ttne budget imnpam:t nif allen--nuative potiries. '"'I' tue CR0 was r:reated prinuuarilv to pr-ovmdc bridget anuahyses arud eromunimunir foremasts thuat arc independent fnonnn thuose nif flue CEA anud Office of Manuagemnucnit amid Budget OMB. linith nuf wluichu tIne President amud Executive Branuchu n:omutr-ol, TIne CBO's forecasts ar-c rcpnim-fed in its l-;conornic arud Bridget Outlook br Economic Outlook mu earlier years, whuichu is rcteased ear-tv flu flue ratemudan' year, Arnrnual (lEA and CBO forecasts fnin real GNP gn-owttu. fine inftationn rate anud ttue level of irmncmuuplovnuerut an-c plotted flu rluan-fs 1-3 for tine pen-iod 1976-87. GNi' amud imuflatiomu values are for,mrttuqirar'fcr--o~'en'-f our-f ln-quan-tcr rates of change, 'flue unncmnnplovnnnenuf n-ate shown is the fniumtti quar-ter' level, Unucnuphovmunemif rate fonecasfs and gcnnem-allv flue for~mn-thu-qtrarter level hint, for tbnc last five years of tue CR0 forecasts, flue predicfioius represerut thue anunnual aver-age unnemnnplovnuenut n-ate, Alfhnough flue (lEA has mnnade eromuomuuic for-erasts since ftuc lafe 1940s, flue data plotted inn ttuc rinar-ts hiegimu mu 1976 for twni n~easorus, t-'irst. flue CBO's inuitial forecast was for-flue year 1976: thus, dim'en:f ronnpar-isomns licfwecmn flue two series are hinunited tn flue post-1976 pen-iod. Sccnumud, befnir'e flue early "U.S. Congress (1978) , p. 1. For a detailed review of the CBO's creation and stated mission, see Meiselman and Roberts (1979) 
STATISTICAL ASSESSMENT OF' FORECAST BIAS
Figun'e 1 shows a conceptuat fn'amewnim-k witln which to assess the relationships thaf nunigbnf occur if the actual values of a specific series uvem-e plotted against the values that luad been predicted. If the fonecasts were perfect -tluar is, if the forecast en'rons at eachu poimuf mu fime wen'e zen-o -a line m-clating flue actual to thue forecast valfucs would have an intcr-n:c 1 ut of zen-ni and a slope of one; tluis line, denoted LPI" in the figur-e, is whiat Mincer arud Zarnowitz 11969) raIl the "line of pem-fect forecasts," Bias in a forecast tuner-ely indicates that the nuean vatine of the art uat scn'ies A is riot equal to fine nnucanu of the fom-ecast series ifn arud, tbienefon-c, tbnaf tlue pniinf E, determined by tlue ordered pair (A,Pl, will riot be on thue LPF' line," Thuc extent of fulas mu 'Moore (1977) has constructed a CEA forecast series for the years 1962-76 based on inferences from the text of the Economic Report of the President. See footnote 6 for further discussion of these earlier forecasts, " Carlson (1982) also has evaluated CEA forecasts and, in the context of a monetarist model, found them to be internally inconsistent, "In more technical terms, the mathematical expectation of the actual series, E(A), is not equal to the expectation of the forecast series, E(P). See, for example, Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969), pp. 6-9' Webb (1967) S the fnin-erasf is depicted mu figtune I as ttie distance huetweeru a point orn tine l.Pl" line anud poimut in. whirh is defined liv tine mnucanus of flue, artual arid forecast series, mu vrew of fins clisn:ussionn, a staridar-d test fnum bias flu a forecast :an lie rornsfrmnrfed liv estimnuatimig a negressionu nif tIne forrnu:
(flY, = a + IuE1Y,( ± wher-e Y is fine actual value of a varialule in pen-iod t, E(Y,( is ifs ''pr-edirted'' or' ''forerasf'' value and e, is flue forecast erniin (actual nnimnus pr'edirf ccl value),' If tine forecast is unbiased, flue regressioru's imutcrrepf, a, should ruot lue significantly diffen'erut fronn zer-o annd ifs slope roeffirierut, Ii, st'nould mnnif lie significantly difier-crnt fr-onnn orue; r-ecatt that fhuese values for-a arid Ii define tine t,PF tine in figure 1. If a = 0 atud hi = I in equafiomu 1, flue arfinal ar'nd fonecasf~'alfues will differ only liv m-anndomtu erron, as nepresemuted liv e,, Mon-cover-, flue er-m-or would eqtrat zero, onu average, over tnir'ig jier-iods of finnc, flue results of esfiminafimug m-cgr-essionus like cquafiomn I for flue (lEA amid (lB0 forecasts nif real GNP gn-nuwth (vi, flue inflation rate (f'l and unemphovmerit rate If]) oven-flue 1976-87 period ar-c sluowrn inn talite 1. 'flue imnuporfamuf rcsirlfs for rurremuf Finnpnises an-c flue F-sfafisfirs ror-r-cspnundimng to flue nuutl hvpoflncsis tiuaf anu equation's intercept ten-nun is equal to zero arid ifs slnipe roefficieruf is equal tni orne, This hvpniftucsis is nnit r-ejerfed for ann~' of tine six equatinins; none of flue F'-sfatisfirs is greater ttuann 0,5 anud flue 5 iuerremnf rrifiral value is 4,10. 'l'huerefore, irrespective of forecast an:n:uracv anud 'Some research in this line of work has asked which measure of the "actual" value should be used: the first-announced (unrevised) figure or the final (revised) value? Throughout, the final, revised figure is used. This choice is defended, logically, on the basis that this value, in fact, is what people are frying to forecast, even though it includes such unknowns as seasonal adjustments and benchmark revisions. As a practical matter, estimates of equation 1 with first-announced data had no qualitative effect on any of the results. McNees (1988) also has found that the choice of measure for actual values has little impact on annual forecasts, such as these, but apparently is important for quarterly forecasts. The results in table I uudirafe that fine fon-erasts of two gover-nnnneruf agenrmes ar-c unbiased, Urnbiasedruess, however, is not uruarnnbiguouslv desiralile if sonic bias is associated wifIu gr-cafer for-crast accurary, Zehlner 1986), fon-example, shows that a biased forerast is the optimnual predictor-undercertain rircumnustanres; Mincer-and Zar-nuowifz (1969) also noted this rhararferisfir, Still, nnnanv observers associate bias wifIn imnarrur-ary in a forecast, Is it possible irusfead that soruue other fom-en:asts ar-c lirased, but mnire an:cur'atc flian thnise nif the (lEA arid (lB0?
As a fir-sf step fo invesfigafe this possibility, flue mean fnir-ns:asfs nif a panel surveyed by the Arnuer'iran Statistical Association amud Nafininal Btur-eau of NOT Absab e ya(ues ft faust a a n parenfhese Fot heslope oeffrcnenis thus eport8r,tf sfafrst c 8pplr to the mnuhf fiypottnes s b 1 The 005 percent utroaf value to I tAti$(tc (two-Sad a ) nyrthu 10 d~gree of fteadom S 6$ The 005~nfrcai value to an F-~statrsticwntl'i 'arrd 10 dop soft eedom ma 410
En ninonuic Reseam n.h I~SiVNBF RI and finn. fnnr erast-, fiom flue large eronuomefnir mmnnidehs of tno mdl kmnowru c-ninsulting fir-ms were em aluafed liv thue sar'ne tests descr flied earlier' ho nnake fhese tests n-ninupar aliln with those air eadm' repor-ted in falile 1 data were exann'nined dun mg flue sannn 19Th S7 inter~'ml for the for-er'tsfs pubhstied rio, esf fo flue r-clcase dates ot flue (lE '~and (B0 pm edmctiorus' plots of actual s, fom rn ast alues are sluownu in hcu ts 4-U, Tine bias In sts fnir tine prim~nn snn ton for c-c asts arm m'n'pcum fed iru talile 2, Ttue r n suits rio riot indicate liias in flue AS Vl\ HER for en asts br amum of fine thn cc man iahles exannrmurd, Mom em er e planafors pouven geruem aIim is hughn-r fnim these equafininus flnarn for fIne c omunpam abin. ( I f or (HO equations. Tine fom en. msts bn'omiu thin-turn norusulfinug fur-runs also exhiliit rio liias inn aiim' n-quatinimu 'ffnd gn riem-ally hi mm e explan'utorv pomven romnipar-able to that nif flue AS V NBER for-crasts, Omer-all fine results in f,tbtes 1 arid 'It also is possible to evaluate CEA pertormance over a longer period. Moore (1977) has constructed a CEA forecast series back to 1962 for output and inflation, inferring quantitative estimates from the qualitative forecasts presented. Although this series is subject to error from such judgmental ad justments, the longer sample increases the power of the test statistics. The results of estimating equations such as equation 1 over the longer sample indicate bias in the inflation equation as the intercept is significantly greater than zero; this result suggests that the CEA, on average, has been overly optimistic about future inflation. No bias is evident in the GNP equation.
"Stephen McNees kindly provided these data. A condition for their use, however, was that the specific firms remain anonymous. Historical data on the economic forecasts of many alternative forecasters also was available (until 1986) 
F-OHECAST ACCURACY
One way to compare fhe accuracy of alter-nat iye forecasts has been proposed by Fair and Sluiiier 1988) , The test is perfom-nned by estimating a n-egression of fhe for-ni:
wher-e i' arud Y.~are tine actual values of the var-iable hieing forecasted in periods f arid t -s, r-espen:-fim'ehy, while ,_~E)Y,,)arid Ely.) are flue pm-edictiorus of frirecasfers #1 and #2 af time f -s fnir flue value of V in Iidrinid f, In fhis analysis, which trses annuah data and nine.-yeam--aluead fnirecasts, s is equal to nine, If the predictions nif either forecaster ernuhodies infom-nuafion beyond the estinnafe nif flue one-period chnange r-epr-esennfed by flie regm'ession's imiter-cept ten-rn. a, then orue rim-hoflu slope coefficients, hi and c mu equation 2, sluouid be sigmuificamuthy different fionn zero. ff(lEA is forecasfer #1 and b is significanfhy diffem-emut fmom zeno hut c is not, one concludes fhiaf flue (lEA fnir'ecasf comutains irseful infom-nnafinin and fnim-ccasf #2 has no infer--mnnafinin not contained iru the (lEA fom-ecasf, Finding c, but riot Ii, significant wniuld carry flue oppnisifc conclusioru, Finding rneifhem Ii muon-c significant indicates fluaf neither fom-ecast has useful imufnirnnationn beyond that cnintained in the irntnurcepf, m-yhicbn is irnmer-preted as the avem'age s-pen-mid change in V'-0
These fesfs ncr-c pen-fornrned fnir all pain's of the (lEA, 010, ASAINBER, Fir-mn A amid Fit-nn B forecasts of oufprrf, inflafinnn and umiermnplovmnernt As fable 3 n-e.jinirfs. a dir-turf c.onnpam-isonn of the (lEA arid (lBO forecasfs shows mneither-rtgenucv adds ruen-' innfon-nnnafion to flue other-s for-ecasf of real GNP gn-om-vfln, ' 0 That a simple extraction of past trends might be considered an alternative to 'expert" forecasts has been suggested by analyses of forecast performance. Meltzer (I 987a.b), for example, has shown that Federal Reserve forecasts were so imprecise that, predicting one quarter into the future, it was impossible to distinguish statistically between a forecast of strong real growth and recession, Another interesting result is reported by Strongin and Binkley (1988) , who find that forecasts made later in the year and incorporating more information than initial forecasts were as likely to deteriorate as to improve. 
